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Abstract
This paper provides a new test of the political economy ”as if” proposition
that underlies nearly all empirical studies that utilize the median voter model.
Specifically, we employ a unique dataset to examine whether the voter with the
median income is decisive in local spending referenda. Previous tests of the me-
dian voter model have typically relied on aggregate cross sectional data to exam-
ine whether the voter with the median income is pivotal. These studies are likely
biased because communities differ across a variety of unobservable dimensions
that are likely correlated with both the cost of providing public services and with
the distribution of income in each community. In contrast to previous studies we
make use of a unique pair of California referendums to estimate a first difference
specification that controls for jurisdiction unobservables. The first referendum
proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding
initiatives from 67 to 50 percent, and the second referendum, which was held only
six months later, proposed lowering the vote requirement from 67 to 55 percent.
This pair of votes allows us to precisely test whether voters vote on each refer-
endum ”as if” future public service provision under the rules of that referendum
would be determined by the income of the proposed decisive voter. This approach
avoids the need to assume that public spending accurately captures public ser-
vice levels and eliminates potential bias from time invariant district attributes that
are likely correlated with median income. Our empirical results suggest that ju-
risdiction median income accurately captures the expected outcomes of majority
votes on public service spending and that voters understand the impact of small
changes in the identity of the decisive voter. The estimated effect of median in-
come on voting are not present in counterfactuals estimated at the census tract and
state assembly district level.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H4, H7, I2
Keywords: Median Voter Hypothesis, Voting, School Spending
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1.   Introduction 
 The median voter hypothesis has a long theoretical and empirical history within public 
economics.  Since the pioneering work of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), which established the 
conditions under which the median voter is also the voter with the median income, hundreds of studies 
have used the median voter framework to estimate demands for publicly provided goods and services.  
The enduring popularity of the median voter model stems both from its simplicity and its analytic 
tractability.  As noted by Inman (1978), if governments act “as if” to maximize the preferences of the 
median income voter, the median voter hypothesis provides “a powerful starting point for predictive and 
normative analysis of government behavior.”   
 Despite the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, a number of the key assumptions 
that make the model so tractable have been repeatedly challenged.1  In particular, empirical application of 
the median voter model typically requires three strong assumptions.  First, one must assume the political 
process leads to public services being delivered that satisfy the preferences of the median voter (the key 
implication of the model itself).  That assumption is unlikely to hold when preferences are not single 
peaked (e.g. Stiglitz 1972; Mckelvey 1976) or when elected officials seek to maximize their budgets (e.g. 
Niskanen 1975; Romer and Rosenthal 1979b, 1982) or when elected officials act strategically due to 
differential voter turnout (e.g. Hastings, Kain, Staiger, and Weinstein 2007).  Second, one must assume 
that median income in a community provides a reasonable proxy for the identity of the median voter.  
That assumption may not hold when there are private alternatives to public goods (e.g. Epple and Romano 
1996) or in the presence of Tiebout sorting (e.g. Goldstein and Pauly 1981; Ross and Yinger 1999).  
Finally, one must assume public spending is a reasonable proxy for the level of publicly provided 
services; an assumption that has been challenged by Behrman and Craig (1987) and Schwab and Zampelli 
(1987).  If any of these three assumptions fail to hold, the key proposition that governments act “as if” to 
maximize the preferences of the median income voter is unlikely to hold.  
Consequently, numerous studies have attempted to test whether the voter with the median income 
is truly pivotal including Pommerehne and Frey (1976), Pommerehne (1978), Inman (1978), Deno and 
Mehay (1987), Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994), Aronsson and Magnus (1996), Turnbull and Mitias 
(1998), and Turnbull and Chang (1998).  While these studies employ different datasets and different 
methodologies, they nevertheless share a common feature:  they all attempt to test the median voter 
hypothesis using the same framework that is typically used to estimate demands for publicly provided 
goods and services.  As a result, these studies are subject to the same criticisms and concerns that 
surround studies that utilize the median voter framework to estimate demands for publicly provided goods 
and services.  Specifically, all the aforementioned studies utilize aggregate cross-sectional data to identify 
                                                 
1 See Holcombe (1989) for a review of the criticisms and concerns surrounding the median voter model. 
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a relationship between public service expenditure levels and a community’s median income.  Because, 
these studies utilize public expenditures as a proxy for the level of publicly provided services, they are 
subject to the same criticisms that surround studies that utilize public expenditures to estimate demands 
for public goods; namely, that public expenditures may be a poor proxy for the actual services demanded 
by residents.  Furthermore, these studies are likely biased because communities differ across a variety of 
dimensions including unobserved preferences for public services, the cost of providing public services, 
voter turnout, etc; and these differences are likely correlated with the distribution of income in each 
community.   
 In this paper, we propose an entirely new approach for testing the median voter hypothesis.  We 
examine vote returns from a unique pair of California referenda that proposed changing the rules under 
which public spending decisions are determined.  Specifically, the first referendum proposed to lower the 
required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent, and the second 
referendum, which was held only six months later, proposed lowering the vote requirement from 67 to 55 
percent.  Thus, the first referenda would have changed the identity of the decisive voter from the voter in 
the 33rd percentile of the income distribution to the 50th percentile while the second referenda would have 
changed the identity of the decisive voter from the voter in the 33rd percentile to the voter in the 45th 
percentile.  Using the results from these two referenda, we test whether people vote “as if” future 
spending decisions will be based upon the preferences of the newly proposed decisive voter by examining 
whether the change in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes cast in the two elections can be explained by the implied 
change in the newly proposed decisive voter’s income (i.e. the difference between the income of the 45th 
and 50th percentile voter in a jurisdiction).   
Unlike previous tests of the median voter hypothesis, where public service spending is used to 
infer a relationship between the median voter’s preferences and outcomes of the political process, our test 
infers that a median voter relationship holds because voters act as if the relationship holds when they cast 
their ballots to determine voting rules for choosing the level of public services provided.  Consequently, 
our test avoids the fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by voters within a 
jurisdiction which may be poorly proxied by the measures used in previous studies, such as expenditures 
per capita.  Furthermore, by regressing changes in the fraction of ‘yes’ votes between the referendums on 
changes in the income associated with the decisive voter (45th and 50th percentile) in each district, we are 
able to difference out school district unobservables that are likely to create a correlation between the 
decisive voter’s income and the political leaning of residents.  We are also able to control for a variety of 
other factors that might have influenced voting changes between the referendum including changes in the 
tax price of the decisive voter, changes in the size and composition of voter turnout, and district size. 
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We find a strong negative relationship between the difference between the 45th and 50th percentile 
incomes and the vote share supporting the referendum in a school district.  A larger income difference 
implies a larger decline in the amount of new education spending that voters can expect with the lower 
vote share requirement by moving the vote share from 50 to 55, and accordingly more voters are willing 
to support the second referendum when it implies a smaller increase in spending (as compared to no 
increase if the referendum fails).  We also examine whether alternative measures of income dispersion 
can explain any variation in vote share changes after controlling for the income difference between the 
45th and 50th percentile.  After considering a variety of alternative measures of income dispersion, our 
results suggest the income difference between the 45th and 50th percentiles explains the vast majority of 
the variation in vote share differences.  These findings are consistent with a world where jurisdiction 
median income accurately captures the expected outcomes of majority votes on public service spending 
and voters understand the impact of small changes in the identity of the decisive voter.  Finally, this 
relationship between the income of the jurisdiction’s decisive voter and the likelihood of supporting a 
referendum does not hold for two counterfactuals estimated by replacing school districts with alternative 
definitions of jurisdiction based on census tracts and state assembly districts. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Over the last several decades hundreds of studies have used the median voter model, developed 
by Bowen (1943) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), to estimate demand for public goods and 
services.2  The vast majority of those studies use aggregate cross sectional data on the observed level of 
spending within a community and a community’s median income to identify demand functions for 
publicly provided goods and services.3   Consequently, these studies either implicitly or explicitly rely on 
the results of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) that show that, “subject to certain strong assumptions, 
majority rule implies that one can treat an observation of expenditure levels in a given jurisdiction as a 
point on the demand curve of a citizen of that community with median income for the community” 
(Bergstrom Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982, p. 1184).   
Despite (or possibly because of) the wide spread popularity of the median voter model, the 
assumptions required for the median voter model to hold have been repeatedly questioned.  Preferences 
                                                 
2 A review of older studies that use the median voter framework to estimate demand can be found in Inman (1979).  
A few of the more recent studies include, Rothstein (1992), Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Stevens and Mason (1996), 
and de Bartolome (1997) for school spending, Schwab and Zampelli (1987) for police, Duncombe (1991) for fire, 
Balsdon, Brunner and Rueben (2003) for local general obligation bond issues, and Husted and Kenny (1997) for 
expansion of the voting franchise.  
3 A smaller set of studies, including Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) and 
Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987), use individual-level survey data to estimate demand for publicly provided 
goods and services.  See Rubinfeld (1987) for a review of these types of studies. 
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may not be single peaked when voters have preferences over multiple issues (McKelvey 1976) or when 
private alternatives exist (Stiglitz 1972; Epple and Romano 1996).  Politicians and bureaucrats may use 
their ability to set the political agenda in order to maximize their budget (Niskanen 1975; Romer and 
Rosenthal 1979a, 1979b, 1982; Romer Rosenthal, and Munley 1992; Balsdon, Brunner, and Ruben 2003), 
or they may make decisions based on their party’s or their own personal ideology (Levitt 1996; Reed 
2006; Washington 2006).  Similarly, politicians may have an incentive to act strategically (and in ways 
that deviate from the preferences of the median voter) because voter turnout may be influenced by 
differential voter reactions to their past actions (Hasting, Kain, Staiger, and Weinstein 2007) or by the 
media (Gentzkow 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007).  
 Further, the standard empirical assumption that the median voter is also the voter with the 
median income has been repeatedly questioned in the literature.  For example, as pointed out by Goldstein 
and Pauly (1981) most of the studies that estimate demand for local public goods and services have 
ignored the issue of Tiebout sorting, in which households choose communities based in part upon their 
demand for public services.  Such sorting induces well-known biases on estimated public service demand 
parameters in cross sectional studies and also calls into question whether median voter is also the voter 
with the median income.  In particular, as noted by Ross and Yinger (1999), with Tiebout sorting 
communities may contain both higher income households with weak preferences for public services and 
lower income households with strong tastes for public services.  Consequently, the median preference 
voter may not be the voter with the median income.4  Similarly, Epple and Romano (1996) show that 
when there are private alternatives to public services (e.g. private schools), an equilibrium exists where 
the median income voter is not pivotal.  Instead, the pivotal voter has an income that lies below the 
median.    
Finally, nearly all studies that utilize the median voter framework to estimate demand for publicly 
provided services suffer from the fundamental problem of measuring the actual services demanded by 
voters.  The vast majority of studies use community-level expenditures to infer a relationship between the 
median voter’s preferences for publicly provided services and outcomes of the political process.  
However, as noted by Behrman and Craig (1987), “… people pay taxes based on the city-wide amount of 
purchased inputs, but base their demand and voting behavior on the perceived level of neighborhood 
service output” (Behrman and Craig, 1987, p. 47).  To the extent that the services produced differ 
substantially across jurisdictions given the same public inputs, public spending will provide a poor proxy 
for public service provision.  Furthermore, unobserved community characteristics that influence the cost 
of providing public services are likely to be correlated with other community characteristics like median 
                                                 
4 Epple and Sieg (1999) estimate a structural model that allows for preference heterogeneity and enables them to 
estimate income and price elasticities in a model that explicitly identifies the median preference voter. 
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income.5  As a result, studies that fail to properly control for the costs associated with providing public 
services are likely to be biased.  That fact is highlighted by Schwab and Zampelli (1987) who find that 
studies of public service demand that fail to take into account the impact of community characteristics on 
the cost of public service provision can yield very misleading results.   
Given all of the aforementioned caveats and concerns, it is not surprising that since the mid-
1970’s numerous studies have attempted to test whether the voter with the median income is truly pivotal.  
Pommerehne and Frey (1976), Pommerehne (1978), Inman (1978), Deno and Mehay (1987), Turnbull 
and Djoundourian (1994) and Turnbull and Mitias (1998) evaluate the performance of the median voter 
model by examining whether the use of median income in local public service demand regressions 
outperforms other specifications (such as replacing median income with mean income).  The results of 
those studies generally support the hypothesis that the median income voter is decisive.  Similarly, using 
a revealed preference approach, Turnbull and Chang (1998) find that local governments act “as if” to 
maximize the utility of the median income voter.  On the other hand, Romer and Rosenthal (1979) argue 
that most studies that utilize the median voter framework, “fail to identify whether the median voter is 
pivotal or a voter at some other fractile is pivotal.”  That conclusion is supported by Aronsson and 
Magnus (1996) who test the predictive power of a model where the median income voter is assumed to be 
decisive against a more general statistical alternative.  Their results lead them to reject the hypothesis that 
the voter with the median income is decisive.   
While the majority of the studies listed above provide support for the median voter model, 
substantial skepticism remains about the model’s empirical relevance primarily due to concerns about the 
validity of the aggregate analyses that support it.   In particular, a common feature of all of the studies 
listed in the preceding paragraph is that they rely on aggregate cross-sectional data to identify the 
relationship between public service outcomes and a community’s median income.  As noted in the 
introduction, these studies are likely biased because communities differ across a variety of dimensions 
including unobserved preferences for public services, the cost of providing public services, voter turnout, 
etc; and these differences are likely correlated with the distribution of income in each community.  
Furthermore, all of the studies listed in the preceding paragraph attempt to test the median voter 
hypothesis using the same framework that is used to estimate demands for publicly provided goods and 
services; namely, by examining the relationship between community expenditures and some measure of 
community income.  Consequently, these studies suffer from the same fundamental problem of measuring 
actual service demands that plagues most studies that utilize the median voter model to estimate demands 
for publicly provided goods.  As a result, it remains unclear whether these studies can accurately identify 
                                                 
5 See Ross and Yinger (1999) for a survey of studies that document cost heterogeneity across jurisdictions, as well 
as recent additional studies by Duncombe and Yinger (2005) and Reschovsky and Imazeki (2003). 
 6
whether or not the voter with the median income is truly decisive and therefore provide confirmation that 
the median voter model accurately describes the public service provision decisions of local jurisdictions. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Prior to 2000, local school bond measures in California required a two-thirds supermajority to 
pass.  If voters approved a bond issue, the bonds were then repaid with local property tax increases that 
remained in effect until the bonds were fully repaid.  In 2000 Californians voted on two statewide 
initiatives designed to ease this supermajority vote requirement.  In March of 2000 Californians voted on 
Proposition 26, an initiative that would have reduced the vote requirement on school bond measures to a 
simple majority.  The proposition garnered the support of only 47 percent of voters and thus failed.  In 
November of 2000 Californians voted on Proposition 39, an initiative that was nearly identical to 
Proposition 26 except it called for reducing the vote requirement on local school bond measures to 55%.  
This time California voters approved the measure with 53 percent of voters voting in favor of Proposition 
39.  
In this section we develop a simple voting model based on Rothstein (1994) in order to illustrate 
the relationship between support for a change in required vote share and the income of the decisive voter.  
Let *ijS  denote the desired level of school spending of individual i located in school district j .  The 
individual votes in favor of a decrease in the vote share required to pass spending referenda to P if and 
only if PS , the spending level under the new vote share, is preferred to 0S , the spending level under the 
current, higher vote share requirement.   
 Following Rothstein (1994), we parameterized individual preferences for school spending using 
the desired spending level *ijS  so that an individual’s indirect utility function )|(
*
ijj SSV  is maximized 
when district spending level *ijj SS = .  Next, we assume that the distribution of preferences in district j is 
distributed around a district mean preference *jS  or 
 
ijjij SS μ+= **           (1) 
 
where ijμ  is a random disturbance.  Assuming preferences over public service levels are single peaked, a 
unique Pjα  exists so that )|()|( 0 PjPjPjj SVaSV α=  where V  is a voter’s indirect utility function 
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conditional on their preferences for the public service.6  A voter supports the referendum to lower the vote 
share requirement presumably increasing public service levels if and only if PjijS α>* .  Parameterizing 
P
jα  as  
 
j
P
jjj
P
jj
P
j SSSSa υδδνα ++−=+= 00 )1(),(        (2) 
 
where δ  is between zero and one and substituting equations (1) and (2) into the inequality above, we find 
that a voter supports the reduction in the vote share requirement if and only if 
 
ijj
P
jjj SSS μυδδ −>+−− ])1[( 0*        (3) 
 
Let jpyes  denote the fraction of voters in district j that prefer 
PS to 0S .  As demonstrated by 
Rothstein (1994), if jυ  and ijμ  follow independent type 1 extreme value distributions, then the log-odds  
can by expressed as: 
 
P
jjj
j
j ScScScc
pyes
pyes
3
0
2
*
101
ln −−+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−       (4) 
 
where c1, c2, and c3 are all non-negative.7  If the first initiative imposed a required vote share of 50% for 
spending referenda and the second initiative imposed a 55% vote share, the difference in the log-odds of 
the fraction of voters that support the two initiatives in district j  is: 
 
                                                 
6 Specifically, we assume that indifference curves are convex over public service levels and property tax rates so that 
given a well-behaved community budget constraint an individual has a unique preferred level of public service and 
utility declines as the public service level is increased above or decreased below that preferred level, see Epple and 
Romano (1996a, 1996b) as well as many other earlier papers that impose such assumptions.   This implies that 
)|( *ijj SSV  is a concave function of jS see Rothstein (1994) and Balsdon and Brunner (2005). 
7 Equation (4) involves aggregate vote shares.  The aggregation from Equation (3), which is based on individual 
preferences, is accomplished via the assumption of an extreme value distribution for the unobservable associated 
with the distribution of individual preferences within a jurisdiction and for the unobservable associated with 
parameterizing Pjα , the preference level in a community that is indifferent between the referendum passing or 
failing.  This assumption leads to jurisdiction vote shares that depend upon the standard logistic distribution.  
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1
ln
1
ln 505531
1
2
2
jj
j
j
j
j SSc
pyes
pyes
pyes
pyes −−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−      (5) 
 
where both the unique district mean preference for public service levels, the default level of public service 
provision, and any idiosyncratic district attributes that are captured by the intercept drop out of the model. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
In order to operationalize equation (5), we assume that for referendum k  the implied future level 
of public service is a function of the income and tax price percentile associated with the vote share 
required under the referendum.  For a 50 percent vote share, the standard median voter assumption applies 
where the future level of public service is a function of the median income and median tax price in the 
school district.  The tax price jp is the median percentile assessed value divided by the property tax 
based per service recipient, or 
50
j
j
j
j hG
E
p ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡  
where the first term is the number of service recipients jE , in this case number of school district students 
divided by the jurisdiction grand list of property assessments jG , and the second term is 50
th percentile 
assessed value of owner-occupied homes.   
For a 55 percent vote share, which is the share associated with the second referendum, the future 
level of public service is a function of the district’s 45th percentile income and tax price.  Specifically, a 
higher vote share for passage decreases the level of public service that will be acceptable to voters and 
thus shifts the decisive income and tax prices further down the distribution.  Assuming a linear form for 
public service demand yields  
 
  jk
P
jp
P
jyk
P
j
P
j
P
j
kkkkk pbybbpySS ε+++== −−−− 100100100100 ),(     (6) 
 
where kP is the required vote share for referendum k , k
P
jy
−100 or jky for short is the income at the 
decisive percentile, kPjp
−100  or jkp  for short is the tax price at the decisive percentile, yb and pb  are 
parameters describing the responsiveness of demand to income and price, kb  is a referendum specific 
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intercept, and jkε is a random error term.  Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) for the two referenda 
yields 
 
)()()()(
1
ln
1
ln 121212121
1
2
2
jjjjpjjy
j
j
j
j ppdyyddd
pyes
pyes
pyes
pyes εε −+−+−+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−  (7) 
 
where the d  parameters are just the b  parameters from equation (6) multiplied by the negative term 
3c− .  The median or decisive voter model predicts that yd should be negative since public service 
demand increases with income as captured by a positive value for yb  and so vote shares should fall as the 
public service level implied by the referendum rises.  Similarly, pd should be positive since public 
service demand falls with tax price a reflected by a negative value for pb .   
This difference specification eliminates unobserved differences across districts in preferences for 
public services, political leaning, time invariant differences in turnout rates, as well as a host of other 
idiosyncratic differences.  Consequently, it eliminates any time invariant factors that might be correlated 
with the income distribution and thus bias a cross-sectional aggregate test of the median or decisive voter 
model.  Nonetheless, one might worry that changes in the decisive percentile income between the 
referenda may be correlated with unobservables that affect the change in vote share between referenda.  
In order to control for these factors, additional models of change in vote share are estimated including 
controls for voter turnout and other time varying jurisdiction attributes, as well as district size. 
Further, an additional specification test is conducted to test whether other measures of 
heterogeneity in the income distribution can explain any variation in vote share changes after controlling 
for the income difference between the 45th and 50th percentile.  Specifically, the predicted residual from 
equation (7), )ˆˆ( 12 jj εε − , is regressed upon the income differences between selected income percentiles, 
or  
 
 )()()()ˆˆ( 80203
7030
2
6040
112 jjjjjjjj yyyyyy −+−+−=− γγγεε     (8) 
 
If these measures of the variance in income across a jurisdiction can explain the residual in vote share, the 
influence of the income change between the 45th and 50th percentile on vote share might also be attributed 
a correlation between vote share and jurisdiction income heterogeneity or omitted variables that are 
correlated with jurisdiction income heterogeneity.  On the other hand, if these variables cannot explain the 
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residual, the findings will support the notion that the income of the decisive percentile voter is sufficient 
for explaining the relationship between public service voting outcomes and jurisdiction income 
distribution.  
 Finally, the specification test described in equation (8) is repeated with alternative, entropy based 
measures of income heterogeneity.  The generalized entropy measure for a distribution is calculated as 
follows  
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= ∑= 1
11)(
1
2
N
i
i
y
y
N
GE
γ
γγγ        (9) 
 
where γ captures the relative weight placed on different regions of the distribution.  As γ increases from 
low levels, emphasis is shifted from the lower tail of the distribution to the middle of the distribution and 
eventually as γ continues to increase to the upper tail of the distribution.  For a basis of comparison, 
values of γ  between –0.5 and 0.0 closely resemble the Gini coefficient, while a γ  of  1.0 and 2.0 yield 
the Theil index and coefficient of variation, respectively.  We will examine values of γ  between –2.5 and 
2.5. 
 
5. Data 
We obtained data on vote outcomes for Propositions 26 and 39 from the Statewide Database, 
maintained by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.  The 
database contains aggregate vote outcomes and voter registration information, for all statewide primary 
and general elections held in California since 1990.  The primary unit of analysis in the statewide 
database is the Census block.  We aggregated the block level vote tallies and voter registration 
information up to the school district level.  Thus, our primary unit of observation is the school district.    
In the empirical framework developed in Section 4, the difference in vote shares between 
Proposition 39 and 26 is a function of the difference between the 45th and 50th percentile income and the 
difference between the 45th and 50th percentile tax price in a school district.  To construct estimates of the 
income percentiles, we used district-level data from the 2000 Census on the distribution of household 
income.  Specifically, the 2000 Census contains information on household income grouped into 17 
income categories.  We used this grouped income data and linear interpolation to estimate the 50th and 
45th percentile level of income in each district.  We used a similar approach to construct measures of the 
50th and 45th percentile tax prices.   
 11
As noted in Section 4, the 50th percentile tax price in district j  is 50j
j
j h
G
E
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
, where jE denotes 
the total enrollment in district j , jG denotes the total assessed value of property in district j  and 
50
jh denotes the 50
th percentile assessed value of owner-occupied homes in district j .  Similarly, the 45th 
percentile tax price is 45j
j
j h
G
E
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
, where 45jh denotes the 45
th percentile assessed value of owner-occupied 
homes in district j .  District-level data on student enrollment in 2000 was obtained from the California 
Department of Education while data on the total assessed value of property in each school district in 2000 
was obtained from the Coalition for Adequate School Housing, a California school advocacy 
organization.  Unfortunately, district-level data on the assessed value of owner-occupied homes in 
California is unavailable.  Consequently, we used data from the 2000 census on the distribution of house 
values (which are grouped into 25 categories) to estimate the 50th and 45th percentile level of home values 
and used these home value percentiles as proxies for 50jh  and 
45
jh  when constructing our tax price 
variables. 
The use of actual home values as a proxy for assessed values may be particularly problematic in 
the case of California due to Proposition 13 which was passed by California voters in 1978.   Specifically, 
Proposition 13 capped property tax rates at one percent of assessed valuation throughout the state.  In 
addition, it changed when and how property was assessed for tax purposes in California.  After the 
passage of Proposition 13, property could only be reassessed upon a change in ownership, at which point 
the property was assessed at full market value.  As a result, the assessed value and market value of homes 
in California can differ substantially depending on when a home was purchased.  In general, the longer a 
resident has lived in their home, the larger the gap between market value and assessed value.  In light of 
that fact, we also constructed two additional variables to control for the difference in the tax price 
between the 50th and 45th percentile voter.  Those variables are the 50th and 45th percentiles of homeowner 
tenure in current residence which we constructed using grouped data from the 2000 census on the number 
of years a homeowner has lived in their current residence.  These variables are designed to control for 
systematic differences across districts in the market value and assessed value of homes.  
We also include a number of additional variables in several of our empirical specifications.  The 
first variable is the difference in voter turnout between Proposition 39 and Proposition 26.   We used data 
on voter registration from the Statewide Database to construct our measure of voter turnout.  Specifically, 
we measure the difference in voter turnout between Propositions 39 and 26 as: 
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j
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Turnout
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)2639( −= ,  
 where jtvote39 is the total number of voters who cast a vote on Proposition 39 in district j , jtvote26 is 
the total number of voters who cast a vote on Proposition 26 in district j  and Total Registered Votersj is 
the total number of registered voters in district j .  We include this variable to account for the potential 
impact changes in voter turnout may have on vote outcomes between the two elections.  The second 
variable is the difference in the fraction of registered Republicans between Proposition 39 and Proposition 
26 and the third variable if the difference in the fraction of registered Democrats between the two 
propositions.  We include these two variables to further control for systematic changes in the composition 
of voter turnout between elections. 
The remaining variables are a set of district size fixed effects.  Districts that are larger and more 
heterogeneous may have responded differently than smaller, more homogenous districts to events that 
occurred between the votes on Propositions 39 and 26, and the difference between 50th and 45th percentile 
income is likely to be correlated with both district size and the general level of income heterogeneity in 
the district.  The strong positive correlation between district size, the change in decisive voter’s income, 
and the change in the share of ‘yes’ votes is illustrated in Table 1 for our data.  Consequently we used 
data on the number of registered voters in each district to construct four indicator variables that take the 
value of unity if the total number of registered voters in a district is in the first, second, third or fourth 
quantile of district size respectively.  In our empirical work, we use districts in the first quantile as a 
reference group and include the second, third and fourth quantile indicator variables as controls.  Note 
that the inclusion of these size category fixed effects in the vote share difference model allows the vote 
share to vary systematically across the two referenda by size category.  
 
{Insert Table 1 Here} 
 
Our data have a number of limitations.  The first limitation concerns school districts with 
overlapping boundaries.  Specifically, California contains three types of school districts: unified districts, 
elementary districts and high school districts.  The boundaries of the latter two types of districts overlap:  
one high school district typically contains two or more elementary districts.  Thus, in non-unified districts 
there are really two decisive voters:  the decisive voter for the elementary school district and the decisive 
voter for the high school district into which the elementary district feeds.  That fact has ramifications for 
our empirical work since in non-unified districts it becomes unclear how one should measure the income 
and tax price of the proposed decisive voter.  Consequently, in the empirical analysis that follows, we 
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restrict our sample to unified school districts.  The second limitation concerns missing data.  Data on the 
fraction of voters supporting Proposition 26 is unavailable for 15 of the 323 school districts operating in 
California in 1999-2000.8    We exclude these 15 districts from our analysis leaving a final sample of 308 
unified school districts. 
Table 2 provides means and standard deviations for the variables used in the analysis.  These 
summary statistics are reported separately for Propositions 26 and 39 respectively.  As expected the 
increase in the vote requirement from 50 to 45 percent is associated with a greater percentage of votes 
supporting the referendum, lower decisive voter income, and lower decisive voter tax share.  The change 
from a summer election (Prop 26) to a November election (Prop 39) also increases turnout from 45.9 to 
66.4 percent of registered voters.    
 
{Insert Table 2 Here} 
 
6. Core Results 
The core regression results for change in vote share are presented in Table 3.  The first column 
presents the basic model that controls only for the change in the decisive voter’s income and tax price.  
The second and third columns contain results from models that include additional controls for turnout and 
household tenure in residence, and the fourth column presents results after controlling for jurisdiction size 
category fixed effects.  As expected, all four regressions imply a strong negative relationship between the 
income of the decisive voter and support for the referendum.  The estimates from the first three models 
suggest that a one percent decrease in the income of the decisive voter should lead to approximately a 0.2 
percent increase in vote share, based on average vote share in the first referendum this is consistent with a 
0.4 percentage point increase in the share voting yes.  The effect size is cut by about half after controlling 
for district size, and a one percent decrease in decisive voter income is consistent with a 0.2 percentage 
increase in share yes.  Using Table 2, the average change in the income of the decisive voter is 9.7 
percent, which is consistent with between a 2 and 4 percent increase in share voting yes between the two 
referenda, while the actual statewide increase in vote share was approximately 3 percent.  We do not find 
any evidence to suggest that voters in the referenda considered the tax price of the decisive voter.   
 
{Insert Table 3 Here} 
 
                                                 
8 The counties of Monterey, Humboldt and San Luis Obispo did not report vote tallies to the Statewide Database for 
Proposition 26. 
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Table 4 presents the results of our first specification test for each of the four models in Table 3.  
The first three panels present the relationship between the predicted residual from the models in Table 3 
and the three individual income percentile differences:  )( 6040 jj yy − , )( 7030 jj yy − , and )( 8020 jj yy − .  
The last panel regresses the residual on all three income difference variables.  None of the models identify 
a statistically significant relationship between the residual and the income difference variables.   
 
{Insert Table 4 Here} 
 
One potential problem with the specification tests reported in Table 4 is that the change in the 
decisive voter’s income )( 5045 jj yy − , is highly correlated with all three of the other income difference 
variables )( 6040 jj yy − , )( 7030 jj yy − , and )( 8020 jj yy − .  In fact, that correlation is always above 0.95.  
Consequently, our specification test may have limited power to distinguish between the effect of changes 
in the income of the decisive voter and other measures that capture income heterogeneity.  Table 5 
presents the correlation between the decisive voter income variable and a variety of generalized entropy 
measures of income dispersion.  These correlations are much lower than the correlation with the income 
difference variables used in Table 4, suggesting that a specification test based on these variables should 
have power to distinguish between the decisive voter effect and a more general effect of income 
heterogeneity.  Table 6 presents the results of regressing the residuals from the models in Table 3 on the 
individual values of γ.  Once again, none of the models identify a statistically significant relationship 
between the residual and the generalized entropy measures of income dispersion.    
 
{Insert Tables 5 and 6 Here} 
 
7. Measurement Error and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 The results of the specification tests reported in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the income difference 
between the 45th and 50th percentiles sufficiently explains the majority of vote share differences.  Thus, 
our results are consistent with a world where jurisdiction median income accurately captures the expected 
outcomes of majority votes on public service spending and voters understand the impact of small changes 
in the identity of the decisive voter.  In other words, our results are consistent with the proposition that the 
median voter is the voter with the median income.  Nevertheless, the results reported in Table 3 may still 
suffer from specification bias if our decisive voter income variable suffers from measurement error.  
Concerns about measurement error seem warranted given that the 50th and 45th income percentiles for 
each jurisdiction must be imputed based on census tabulations that divide the population into 17 income 
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categories.  While these imputations may accurately represent across district differences in income, the 
difference between the imputed 50th and 45th percentile incomes may be far less accurate in capturing 
across district differences in the change in the decisive voter’s income.  Measurement error should 
attenuate the coefficient estimate on the decisive voter income variable and thus the estimates reported in 
Table 3 should provide a lower bound on the relationship between vote share and the decisive voter’s 
income.   
The standard approach for addressing measurement error is instrumental variables.  The 
generalized entropy measures of income dispersion used in the previous sections provide reasonable 
candidates for instruments given the ability of these variables to explain changes in the decisive voter’s 
income between the two referenda.  Further, the standard overidentification test for instrumental variables 
estimation also tests our proposition that the change in decisive voter income is sufficient to explain the 
entire empirical relationship between jurisdiction vote share and the jurisdiction’s income distribution.  
Overidentification tests explicitly ask the following question:  Do the instruments enter into the second 
stage equation in a way that is not captured by the linear combination of those variables that was 
estimated in the first stage?  If our instruments enter into the second stage in a form that differs from how 
they enter the first stage, one or more of those variables could not have entered the second stage solely 
through the first stage variable, a violation of the exclusion restriction assumption.  In our case, a rejection 
of the exclusion restrictions suggests that other measures of income heterogeneity belong in the voter 
share model, while a failure to reject the exclusion restrictions supports our initial hypothesis that 
information on decisive voter income is sufficient to explain changes in vote share. 
Table 7 presents the results of these specification tests where each model includes three 
generalized entropy measures where the values of γ are chosen to reduce the correlation between the three 
measures being used in the same specification.9  Specifically, the three panels in Table 7 present the 
residual regression results using entropy measures based on the following values of γ:  (-2.5, -0.5, 2.5),  
(-2.0, 0, 2.0), and (-1.5, 0.5, 1.5).  The parameter estimates on the decisive voter income variable increase 
moderately by between 25 and 70 percent, and therefore are consistent with measurement error in the 
explanatory variable.  The largest changes occur in the specification that includes jurisdiction size 
category fixed effects, and the effect of a one percent decrease in the income of the decisive voter 
increases from a 0.2 percentage point increase in share voting yes to more than a 0.3 percent increase for 
the size fixed effect model.   
 
                                                 
9 The estimates of all first stage models are presented in an appendix that is available upon request along with F-tests 
that establish that the instruments have substantial explanatory power in the first stage, suggesting that our 
instrumental variable estimates are not biased by weak instruments. 
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{Insert Table 7 Here} 
 
Finally, measurement error may also be present in the tax price variable and the resulting 
attenuation bias may be substantially larger.  The 50th percentile owner-occupied house value is likely to 
be a seriously flawed indicator of the median tax burden.  In addition to measurement error based on 
imputations from the distribution of house values in a jurisdiction, self reported house values in the 
census are likely to vary dramatically from tax assessments because proposition 13 in California prohibits 
the reassessment of owner-occupied houses for property tax purposes except for when the house is sold.  
The change in tax price arising in Equation (7) is the difference between the 45th and 50th  percentile 
house value divided by the property tax based per service recipient, or 
( ) ( )504512 jj
j
j
jj hhG
E
pp −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡−  
The ratio of number of service recipients or students (Ej) to the jurisdiction grand list of assessments (Gj) 
provides an instrument that will be correlated with changes in decisive percentile tax price and yet 
uncorrelated with measurement error that arises because the census distribution of house values does not 
accurately represent the actual distribution of assessed values.   
Instrumenting for tax price using the ratio of the number of service recipients to the jurisdiction 
grand list has no meaningful impact on any previously estimated coefficients.  The effect of decisive voter 
income is robust in terms of both significance and magnitude, and the estimated effect of tax price 
remains small and statistically insignificant.10    
 
 
8.  Counterfactuals 
 The results reported in sections 6 and 7 consistently support the hypothesis that the income 
difference between the 45th and 50th percentile voter adequately and sufficiently explains changes in vote 
outcomes between Proposition 26 and Proposition 39.  Thus, our results provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that the median voter is also the voter with the median income.  However, before we accept 
that conclusion, it would be helpful to know whether we have truly identified a relationship between 
changes in the school district’s decisive voter’s income and changes in vote shares or whether we are 
                                                 
10 All income and tax price instruments are included in the first stage models for both decisive voter income and tax 
price.  As before, overidentification tests fail to reject the exclusion restrictions.  Finally, F-tests confirm that the 
instruments have power to explain the decisive voter income and tax price variables both as a complete set of 
instruments, as well as when focusing on the instruments created for one decisive voter variable conditioning on the 
instruments created for the second variable.  These estimates and the IV specification tests are available upon 
request. 
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simply picking up a spurious relationship caused by some other unobserved factor that might persist at a 
variety of levels of spatial aggregation.  To address this concern, we conduct two counterfactuals.  The 
logic behind our counterfactuals is simple:  if the relationship we have identified is truly causal, then it 
should hold for school districts (which would have been directly affected by the outcomes of Propositions 
26 and 39) but it should not hold for other political or geographic entities.  For example, while we expect 
the income difference between the 45th and 50th percentile voter in a school district to explain differences 
in vote shares within school districts we would not expect the income difference between the 45th and 50th 
percentile voter in a census tract or an state assembly district to explain differences in vote shares within 
those geographic/political entities.  That is, for political/geographic entities other than school districts, the 
income difference between the 45th and 50th  voter should be uncorrelated with changes in vote shares.   
 Our rationale for choosing census tracts and state assembly districts is based on their size and 
their lack of relevance for the provision of any local public services.  Census tracts tend to be much 
smaller than school districts while state assembly districts tend to be much large than school districts 
(California contains 80 state assembly districts).  Thus, our counterfactuals cover geographic/political 
entities that are both smaller and larger than school districts.  Further, since the neither of these 
geographic regions represents a level of local governments, the median income and tax price variables 
could not be related to any unexpected fiscal implications of Propositions 26 and 39. 
 To implement our counterfactuals we estimate models identical to those reported in Table 3 using 
data on vote shares, income differences, tax price differences, etc, that are calculated for either census 
tracts or state assembly districts.  For example, our counterfactual involving census tracts utilizes 
information for 6,796 census tracts on vote share differences in a census tract, income differences 
between the 45th and 50th percentile voter in a census tract, etc.  Similarly, our counterfactual involving 
state assembly districts (SAB) utilizes information for the 80 SAB’s in California on vote share 
differences within SAB’s, income differences within SAB’s, etc.   
 Results based on these counterfactuals are reported in Table 8.11  The results reported in Table 8 
are quite striking.  The estimated coefficients on the income difference between the 45th and 50th 
percentile voter are statistically insignificant in all our counterfactuals, and the magnitude of the estimates 
are substantially smaller than the estimates for school districts.  For example, in model 4 involving census 
tracts the estimated coefficient on the income difference variable is -0.019.  The corresponding estimate 
                                                 
11 In the interest of brevity, we report only the estimated coefficients on the income difference and tax price 
difference variables. The complete set of estimated coefficients for model 4, the model that includes our complete 
set of control variables, is included in an appendix that is available upon request. 
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for school districts reported in Table 3 and the top panel of Table 8 is -0.127 or 6 times larger than the 
estimate based on census tracts.12   
 
{Insert Table 8 Here}  
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper provides a direct test of the political economy “as if” proposition that underlies nearly 
all empirical studies that utilize the median voter model.  Specifically, we employ a unique dataset to 
examine whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending referenda.  Previous tests 
of the median voter model have typically relied on aggregate cross sectional data to examine whether the 
voter with the median income is pivotal.  These studies are likely biased because communities differ 
across a variety of unobservable dimensions that are likely correlated with the distribution of income in 
each community.  In contrast to previous studies we make use of a pair of California referendums to 
estimate a first difference specification that controls for jurisdiction unobservables.  The first referendum 
proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 
percent, and the second referendum, which was held only six months later, proposed lowering the vote 
requirement from 67 to 55 percent.   This pair of votes allows us to precisely test whether the income and 
tax price of the decisive voter affects the willingness of voters to support the referendum.  
Our empirical results suggest that jurisdiction median income accurately captures the expected 
outcomes of majority votes on public service spending and that voters understand the impact of small 
changes in the identity of the decisive voter.  The estimates from most models suggest that a one percent 
decrease in the income of the decisive voter should lead to approximately a 0.2 percent increase in vote 
share, based on average vote share in the first referendum this is consistent with a 0.4 percentage point 
increase in the share voting yes.  This effect size is cut by about half after controlling for district size, and 
a one percent decrease in decisive voter income is consistent with a 0.2 percentage point increase in share 
yes.  These effects are consistent with between a 2 and 4 percentage point increase in the statewide share 
voting yes between the two referenda, while the actual statewide increase in vote share was approximately 
3 percent.  Instrumental variable estimation for measurement error increases the associated change 
between the two referenda to between a 3 and 6 percentage point increase in the share voting yes.  
Finally, the estimated effect of median income on voting is not present in counterfactuals estimated at the 
census tract and state assembly district level.   
                                                 
12 The census tract model includes district fixed effects so that all estimates are based on within school district 
comparisons.  The estimates from this fixed effect model are insulated against the systematic across district variation 
that drives the estimates in the school district sample.  Standard errors for this model are also clustered at the school 
district level because heteroscedasticity can bias the estimation of standard errors in fixed effect models. 
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Table 1 
Voter Turnout and Differences in Vote Shares and Income by Quantiles of District Size 
 
Quantiles Based on Number 
of Registered Voters
Vote Share Difference 
(Prop 39-Prop26)
Income Difference 
(45th - 50th)
Voter Turnout 
Difference
First Quantile                  
(Less than 3,704)
0.015               
(0.041)
-3,463               
(1,246)
0.21             
(0.09)
Second Quantile                   
(3,704 - 14,242)
0.018               
(0.031)
-4,529               
(1,884)
0.22             
(0.08)
Third Quantile                    
(14,243 - 36,928)
0.038               
(0.026)
-5,055               
(1,293)
0.25             
(0.07)
Fourth Quantile                     
(greater than 36,928)
0.042               
(0.026)
-5,242               
(1,438)
0.25             
(0.06)  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fraction Yes 0.477 0.085 0.505 0.084
Income 47,297 17,299 42,724 15,815
Tax Price 0.530 0.292 0.503 0.278
Years in Current Residence 10.14 2.77 8.57 2.32
Turnout 0.459 0.094 0.664 0.069
Fraction Republican 0.373 0.114 0.374 0.114
Fraction Democrat 0.441 0.108 0.436 0.106
Proposition 26 Proposition 39
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Table 3 
Baseline Coefficient Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income -0.156** -0.207** -0.227** -0.127**
[0.053] [0.060] [0.063] [0.056]
Tax Price -0.287 0.080 0.278 0.171
[0.410] [0.410] [0.419] [0.355]
Years in Current Residence -0.047* -0.046* -0.034
[0.024] [0.024] [0.023]
Turnout -0.108 -0.118
[0.116] [0.118]
Fraction Democrat 0.779* 0.403
[0.424] [0.374]
Fraction Republican -0.010 0.114
[0.476] [0.449]
Second Quantile of Size 0.003
[0.024]
Third Quantile of Size 0.077**
[0.023]
Fourth Quantile of Size 0.090**
[0.024]
Constant 0.036 -0.001 0.003 0.019
[0.029] [0.036] [0.045] [0.044]
R-Square 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.15
Observations 308 308 308 308
Notes:  (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, (2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%  
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Table 4 
Coefficient Estimates from Regressions of Residual on Alternative Income Differences 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y40 - y60 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]
F-statistic 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
y30 - y70 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
F-statistic  0.07  0.10 0.08 0.10
y20 - y80 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
F-statistic 0.15  0.22 0.19 0.13
y40 - y60 0.105 0.100 0.101 0.091
[0.064] [0.062] [0.062] [0.061]
y30 - y70 -0.024 -0.019 -0.017 -0.040
[0.054] [0.055] [0.055] [0.050]
y20 - y80 -0.016 -0.019 -0.020 -0.003
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022]
F-statistic  1.23 1.32 1.36  0.81
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation Matrix for Various Inequality Measures 
 
Variable (y45 - y50) GE(-2.5) GE(-2.0) GE(-1.5) GE(-1.0) GE(-0.5) GE(0) GE(0.5) GE(1.0) GE(1.5) GE(2.0) GE(2.5)
(y45 - y50) 1
GE(-2.5) -0.7231 1
GE(-2.0) -0.6841 0.9859 1
GE(-1.5) -0.5685 0.919 0.9709 1
GE(-1.0) -0.396 0.7983 0.8803 0.9644 1
GE(-0.5) -0.1963 0.6337 0.7349 0.8623 0.9645 1
GE(0) -0.0418 0.4878 0.5939 0.741 0.8864 0.9755 1
GE(0.5) 0.0729 0.3625 0.4663 0.6182 0.788 0.9141 0.9795 1
GE(1.0) 0.1726 0.2335 0.3303 0.4787 0.6613 0.8136 0.9137 0.9754 1
GE(1.5) 0.2495 0.1003 0.1835 0.3186 0.5003 0.6652 0.7897 0.8873 0.9647 1
GE(2.0) 0.2663 -0.0043 0.0588 0.1683 0.3282 0.4828 0.6105 0.7259 0.8442 0.9523 1
GE(2.5) 0.2147 -0.0501 -0.0077 0.0706 0.1934 0.3171 0.4258 0.5354 0.6683 0.8242 0.9552 1  
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Table 6 
Coefficient Estimates from Regressions of Residual on Alternative Income Inequality Measures 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GE(-2.5) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
F-statistic 0.12   0.10 0.19 0.02
GE(-2.0) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
F-statistic 0.09  0.06 0.15 0.08
GE(-1.5) -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.017]
F-statistic  0.19 0.12 0.26 0.31
GE(-1.0) -0.035 -0.031 -0.038 -0.035
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042]
F-statistic 0.66  0.52   0.75 0.72
GE(-0.5) -0.094 -0.088 -0.095 -0.081
[0.079] [0.080] [0.079] [0.077]
F-statistic 1.38   1.20  1.46  1.13
GE(0) -0.151 -0.144 -0.150 -0.117
[0.115] [0.115] [0.114] [0.112]
F-statistic  1.74  1.56 1.74  1.10
GE(0.5) -0.163 -0.156 -0.159 -0.114
[0.133] [0.134] [0.133] [0.131]
F-statistic  1.49  1.34 1.44   0.75
GE(1.0) -0.121 -0.117 -0.120 -0.076
[0.121] [0.122] [0.121] [0.120]
F-statistic   1.00  0.92   0.98  0.40
GE(1.5) -0.062 -0.062 -0.065 -0.031
[0.079] [0.080] [0.079] [0.078]
F-statistic  0.61  0.60 0.66  0.16
GE(2.0) -0.021 -0.022 -0.024 -0.007
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032]
F-statistic  0.40 0.44   0.53  0.04
GE(2.5) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.000
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
F-statistic 0.35 0.43 0.59 0.00
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets  
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Table 7 
Instrument Variables Estimation 
 
O.L.S. 2SLS O.L.S. 2SLS O.L.S. 2SLS O.L.S. 2SLS
Income -0.156** -0.172** -0.207** -0.224** -0.227** -0.240** -0.125** -0.167**
[0.053] [0.055] [0.060] [0.065] [0.063] [0.072] [0.058] [0.068]
Tax Price -0.287 -0.261 0.080 0.126 0.278 0.308 -0.109 0.256
[0.410] [0.400] [0.410] [0.407] [0.419] [0.413] [0.361] [0.349]
Hansen J Statistic 1.54 1.34 1.68 2.10
Income -0.156** -0.194** -0.207** -0.254** -0.227** -0.270** -0.125** -0.176**
[0.053] [0.058] [0.060] [0.069] [0.063] [0.075] [0.058] [0.071]
Tax Price -0.287 -0.224 0.080 0.205 0.278 0.381 -0.109 0.275
[0.410] [0.394] [0.410] [0.402] [0.419] [0.414] [0.361] [0.352]
Hansen J Statistic 2.34 1.99 2.18 2.58
Income -0.156** -0.213** -0.207** -0.280** -0.227** -0.295** -0.125** -0.179**
[0.053] [0.066] [0.060] [0.079] [0.063] [0.087] [0.058] [0.083]
Tax Price -0.287 -0.191 0.080 0.276 0.278 0.442 -0.109 0.282
[0.410] [0.393] [0.410] [0.409] [0.419] [0.426] [0.361] [0.364]
Hansen J Statistic 3.08 2.60 2.62 2.94
Notes:  (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, (2) Panel 1 instruments using GE(-2.5), GE(-0.5), GE(2.5), (3) panel 2 instruments using GE(-2.0), GE(0), GE(2.0), (4) 
panel 3 instruments using GE(-1.5), GE(0.5), GE(1.5).
(4)(1) (2) (3)
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 Table 8 
Counterfactuals 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income -0.156** -0.207** -0.227** -0.127**
[0.053] [0.060] [0.063] [0.056]
Tax Price -0.287 0.080 0.278 0.171
[0.410] [0.410] [0.419] [0.355]
Observations 308 308 308 308
Income 0.001 0.002 -0.020 -0.019
[0.018] [0.018] [0.013] [0.012]
Tax Price 0.061 0.043 0.028 0.026
[0.077] [0.087] [0.092] [0.092]
Observations 6796 6796 6796 6796
Income 0.025 -0.114 -0.141 -0.026
[0.081] [0.117] [0.119] [0.120]
Tax Price -0.808 -0.255 -0.143 -0.293
[0.705] [0.755] [0.671] [0.663]
Observations 80 80 80 80
School Districts
Census Tracts
State Assembly Districts
Notes:  (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, (2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%  
 
